8/17/12- While the NATO nations' propaganda machine gears into overdrive on Syria, with nearly every major Western publication and news outlet now explicity acting on behalf of Syria's "rebels", it is high time for an objective and purely un-emotional survey of the situation in Syria as it stands today.

On the ground, the Syrian Army has managed to dislodge the terrorist groups from all of their Damascus footholds, while Aleppo has yet to be completely cleared. Sporadic clashes are occurring around Aleppo daily, particularly around the major airport. Despite their continued presence in the area, the "rebels" suffered a very heavy and demoralizing defeat in the Salah-El Din district of Aleppo, and have now been effectively scattered.

Across Syria, however, there are pockets of "rebel" control, and there is no denying that the authorities have lost day to day control over certain areas. This situation fits in with what is most likely NATO's desired scenario in Syria, which is to bring about a stalemate in which the "rebels"control some definite territory, while the government maintains control over other regions. This state of affairs would allow NATO to determine the character and objectives of the "rebels" in a manageable enclave. However, any hopes on the "rebel" side that Aleppo would be the seat of such an enclave have been resoundly dashed, as the Syrian Army has been dominant in most engagements on the ground, and of course controls the air.

With continued support from Iran in particular, the Syrian government is unlikely to fall, as they will be re-fueled, re-armed, and re-supplied at every turn. The Syrian Army is a professional, highly trained force with a solidly loyal core of capable fighters. While NATO would certainly like to see the current state of affairs perpetuate, culminating in the full realization of the above-mentioned scenario in which both sides control territory, much depends on how the fighting on the ground proceeds. If the Syrian Army can cleanse and hold Aleppo as they have done in Damascus, they will have more resources to devote to crushing the "rebels" elsewhere, and a process of consolidation may take place. However, much depends on the speed and effectiveness with which the government can fully pacify Aleppo.

A Fragmented Syria: NATO's Dream Scenario

5/9/12- From NATO's perspective, there can be no better outcome to the conflict in Syria than to see a fragmented nation, with both sides controlling a defined territorial space. That scenario would render Syria useless as an ally of Iran, while preventing the rise to power of Wahabi extremists, which is a distinct possibility should the Assad regime fall. Thus, it would be the best of both worlds.

With this in view, the Assad regime has absolutely no fear of a NATO military intervention at the moment. The US has undoubtedly given the green light to the Saudis and others to continue the clandestine arming and financing of the Sunni groups in Syria. The aim of this policy is not to cause Assad's downfall, but rather to ensure the continuation of a perpetual conflict in Syria.

Reconsidering Iran's Relationship With Turkey

5/4/12- In light of recent friction between Iran and Turkey over a variety of issues, it is high time for Iran to reconsider its strategic and diplomatic posture vis-a-vis Turkey.

Turkey, as a NATO member will undoubtedly be instrumental in the implementation of the much discussed missile shield, which poses a direct security threat to Iran, Russia, and other regional countries. Unless Turkey is willing to abstain from participation in the shield program, which is highly unlikely, Iran should seriously consider reciprocal action, such as engaging Armenia on possible joint military cooperation and exercises close to the Turkish border to send Ankara an unmistakable message.

Furthermore, with the increasing strength of Maliki's Iraq, and it's friendly disposition towards Iran, a genuine possibility for a joint Iran/Iraq axis exists. If such an alliance is formalized, and if it ever extends to close military cooperation, Iran will have the strategic freedom to push Turkey away, and restrict it's ties with Ankara to purely economic interests.

In addition to these considerations, the Kurdish issue is always relevant in a discussion of Iran/Turkey ties.
Iran is dealing with elements of the PJAK group operating along its north-western border regions. Turkey can provide valuable assistance with the Kurdish problem, but at what price to Iran? It would be far wiser
strategically for Iran to neutralize its Kurdish problem alone, while clandestinely providing support to anti-Turkish Kurdish groups, in the event that proxy elements become useful in any future conflict with Turkey.

Russia May Act if Iran Attacked

4/21/12- This is a brief note on the possibility that in the event Iran is attacked by the U.S. and/or Israel, Russia may take the opportunity to invade Georgia and finally finish off Sakashvilli, thereby opening up an overland route to Russian military bases in Armenia which may be used to transport supplies and materiel to Iran during a conflict.

Russian officials have recently spoken regarding this possibility, and there is certainly a faction in the Kremlin that views a possible attack on Iran as an opportunity for Russia to settle old scores with Georgia while expanding her strategic posture by establishing overland contact with Armenian bases.

Assistance to Iran by Russia through Armenia in the vent of an attack on Iran may not tale the form of overt military aid, but may include covert transfers and other forms of clandestine assistance. More will follow on this matter in time.

Nuclear Talks No Place for Compromise

4/21/12-  The Istanbul talks taking place between Iran and the so-called P5 nations is certainly an opportunity for both sides to fully air out all concerns. Yet, it should not be interpreted by the West as an Iranian capitulation or attempt to compromise, nor should the Iranian side approach the talks from that perspective.

Iran's position on the matter has been clear for quite some time. Thus, the ball is surely in the NATO countries' court as to how we proceed from this point. Undoubtedly, NATO and its minions understand that the existence of Iran's nuclear program, including further enrichment, research, and infrastructure development is not up for negotiation. The only point that is available for discussion is precisely how NATO chooses to accept the fact of Iran's rise and the new order in the Middle East.

The fact is that  NATO and its lackeys will either acknowledge and respect Iran's will, or they will continue to saber rattle and blow hot air. The former approach will lead to peace and the opportunity for a prosperous future in the region, while the latter will lead to greater uncertainty and perhaps a war that is in no one's interests.

A Brief Note on Iran's Potential 2013 Presidential Contenders

3/21/12- As President Ahmadinejad sets to fade from the scene at the conclusion of his second term next year, it would be worthwhile to discuss his potential successors.

We ought to begin by briefly discussing Iran's various factions and their current positions of power. The Principlist faction has, of course, been ascendant since 2005. Ahmadinejad, Parliament speaker Ali Larijani, former Revolutionary Gaurds commander and Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and former Gaurds Commander in Chief Mohsen Rezai are the major figures in this faction. The faction, however, is irredeemably split largely because Supreme Leader Khamenei has sided with Larijani, Rezai, and the technocratic principlists against the increasingly anti-clerical, populist, and nationalist rumblings of the Ahmadinejad camp. Ahmadinejad himself was never a regime insider, and he has been firmly ejected from Khamenei's personal network. Thus, we really can no longer view the Principlists as a unified faction since Ahmadinejad and his camp have been eschewed.

The Pragmatic Conservatives, led by Ayatollah Rafsanjani have seen their power diminished since 2009 and it is unlikely that the next president will hail from this camp. Rafsanjani is still chairman of the Expediency Council and the largely neutered Assembly of Experts. Former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani still wields considerably personal influence behind the scenes, while many in the clerical establishment broadly identify with this camp. The Pragmatic Conservatives also have a considerable following among the important bazaari demographic.

The traditional conservatives, represented by the likes of Ayatollah Jannati and Ahmad Khatami retain considerable influence and maintain extensive personal networks, yet they represent the aging old gaurd of the Revolution, and are unlikely to produce the next president.

We finally come to the Reformist camp, represented by the Green movement and its supporters such as Mousavi, Karroubi, and former president Khatami. This faction has been almost completely marginalized from public affairs, although some influential clerics with Reformist tendencies still retain influence both in Qom and in Tehran. Because of the very personal and often private nature of the Iranian political system, even a publicly marginalized faction such as the Reformists can still maintain personal, private ties to the Supreme Leader, and thereby remain relevant.

With all of this in mind, it would be safe to say that the next president is likely to arise out of the newly realigned Principlist camp. Since Ahmadinejad and his supporters have been driven out of the Principlist faction, the most likely contenders for the presidency are Ahmadinejad enemies Larijani, Qalibaf, or Rezai. It is unlikely that any Ahmadinejad Principlists will have much success in 2013.

The final prediction at this point would have to be Larijani in 2013, unless unforeseen events intervene.

Iran's 2012 Parliamentray Elections: A Victory for Corruption?

3/5/12- The major rift in Iranian politics between supporters of President Ahmadinejad and those who back the Supreme Leader Khamenei appears to have been resolved in favor of the Supreme Leader.

If the results from last week's parliamentary elections are any indication, Khamenei's supporters are unquestionably in the ascendancy. This is certainly troubling news for those who are fed up with the corruption of the clerical class in Iranian society, for it seems that the conservative clergy, ever vigilant in defense of self-interest have brought their power to bear on Ahmadinejad.

How, the reader may ask, did Ahmadinejad run afoul of so many in the clerical establishment? He messed with their money, to put it bluntly. Ahmadinejad, after being elected in 2005 adopted an uncompromising stance against the corruption and outright thievery of  certain elements of the clergy. For example, he ended the clergy's flouting of import duties for certain foreign goods, and rendered impossible the registration of stolen cars imported from abroad. Needless to say these measures infuriated those clergymen with parasitic tendencies.

What is more, Ahmadinejad displayed a fiercely independent drive that put him at odds with the Supreme Leader on matters of policy, such as Ahmadinejad's support for the attendance of women at sporting events, his dismissal of Mottaki as foreign minister, his dismissal of Moslehi as Intelligence minister, his mild criticism of Syria's tactics, and his emphasis on Iranian nationalism and national identity.

And now it appears as if the Supreme Leader's camp has succeeded in using the economic uncertainty felt by many Iranians to derail Ahmadinejad's presidency in its final year.