3/21/12- As President Ahmadinejad sets to fade from the scene at the conclusion of his second term next year, it would be worthwhile to discuss his potential successors.
We ought to begin by briefly discussing Iran's various factions and their current positions of power. The Principlist faction has, of course, been ascendant since 2005. Ahmadinejad, Parliament speaker Ali Larijani, former Revolutionary Gaurds commander and Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and former Gaurds Commander in Chief Mohsen Rezai are the major figures in this faction. The faction, however, is irredeemably split largely because Supreme Leader Khamenei has sided with Larijani, Rezai, and the technocratic principlists against the increasingly anti-clerical, populist, and nationalist rumblings of the Ahmadinejad camp. Ahmadinejad himself was never a regime insider, and he has been firmly ejected from Khamenei's personal network. Thus, we really can no longer view the Principlists as a unified faction since Ahmadinejad and his camp have been eschewed.
The Pragmatic Conservatives, led by Ayatollah Rafsanjani have seen their power diminished since 2009 and it is unlikely that the next president will hail from this camp. Rafsanjani is still chairman of the Expediency Council and the largely neutered Assembly of Experts. Former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani still wields considerably personal influence behind the scenes, while many in the clerical establishment broadly identify with this camp. The Pragmatic Conservatives also have a considerable following among the important bazaari demographic.
The traditional conservatives, represented by the likes of Ayatollah Jannati and Ahmad Khatami retain considerable influence and maintain extensive personal networks, yet they represent the aging old gaurd of the Revolution, and are unlikely to produce the next president.
We finally come to the Reformist camp, represented by the Green movement and its supporters such as Mousavi, Karroubi, and former president Khatami. This faction has been almost completely marginalized from public affairs, although some influential clerics with Reformist tendencies still retain influence both in Qom and in Tehran. Because of the very personal and often private nature of the Iranian political system, even a publicly marginalized faction such as the Reformists can still maintain personal, private ties to the Supreme Leader, and thereby remain relevant.
With all of this in mind, it would be safe to say that the next president is likely to arise out of the newly realigned Principlist camp. Since Ahmadinejad and his supporters have been driven out of the Principlist faction, the most likely contenders for the presidency are Ahmadinejad enemies Larijani, Qalibaf, or Rezai. It is unlikely that any Ahmadinejad Principlists will have much success in 2013.
The final prediction at this point would have to be Larijani in 2013, unless unforeseen events intervene.
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