8/17/12- While the NATO nations' propaganda machine gears into overdrive on Syria, with nearly every major Western publication and news outlet now explicity acting on behalf of Syria's "rebels", it is high time for an objective and purely un-emotional survey of the situation in Syria as it stands today.
On the ground, the Syrian Army has managed to dislodge the terrorist groups from all of their Damascus footholds, while Aleppo has yet to be completely cleared. Sporadic clashes are occurring around Aleppo daily, particularly around the major airport. Despite their continued presence in the area, the "rebels" suffered a very heavy and demoralizing defeat in the Salah-El Din district of Aleppo, and have now been effectively scattered.
Across Syria, however, there are pockets of "rebel" control, and there is no denying that the authorities have lost day to day control over certain areas. This situation fits in with what is most likely NATO's desired scenario in Syria, which is to bring about a stalemate in which the "rebels"control some definite territory, while the government maintains control over other regions. This state of affairs would allow NATO to determine the character and objectives of the "rebels" in a manageable enclave. However, any hopes on the "rebel" side that Aleppo would be the seat of such an enclave have been resoundly dashed, as the Syrian Army has been dominant in most engagements on the ground, and of course controls the air.
With continued support from Iran in particular, the Syrian government is unlikely to fall, as they will be re-fueled, re-armed, and re-supplied at every turn. The Syrian Army is a professional, highly trained force with a solidly loyal core of capable fighters. While NATO would certainly like to see the current state of affairs perpetuate, culminating in the full realization of the above-mentioned scenario in which both sides control territory, much depends on how the fighting on the ground proceeds. If the Syrian Army can cleanse and hold Aleppo as they have done in Damascus, they will have more resources to devote to crushing the "rebels" elsewhere, and a process of consolidation may take place. However, much depends on the speed and effectiveness with which the government can fully pacify Aleppo.
Friday, August 17, 2012
Wednesday, May 9, 2012
A Fragmented Syria: NATO's Dream Scenario
5/9/12- From NATO's perspective, there can be no better outcome to the conflict in Syria than to see a fragmented nation, with both sides controlling a defined territorial space. That scenario would render Syria useless as an ally of Iran, while preventing the rise to power of Wahabi extremists, which is a distinct possibility should the Assad regime fall. Thus, it would be the best of both worlds.
With this in view, the Assad regime has absolutely no fear of a NATO military intervention at the moment. The US has undoubtedly given the green light to the Saudis and others to continue the clandestine arming and financing of the Sunni groups in Syria. The aim of this policy is not to cause Assad's downfall, but rather to ensure the continuation of a perpetual conflict in Syria.
With this in view, the Assad regime has absolutely no fear of a NATO military intervention at the moment. The US has undoubtedly given the green light to the Saudis and others to continue the clandestine arming and financing of the Sunni groups in Syria. The aim of this policy is not to cause Assad's downfall, but rather to ensure the continuation of a perpetual conflict in Syria.
Friday, May 4, 2012
Reconsidering Iran's Relationship With Turkey
5/4/12- In light of recent friction between Iran and Turkey over a variety of issues, it is high time for Iran to reconsider its strategic and diplomatic posture vis-a-vis Turkey.
Turkey, as a NATO member will undoubtedly be instrumental in the implementation of the much discussed missile shield, which poses a direct security threat to Iran, Russia, and other regional countries. Unless Turkey is willing to abstain from participation in the shield program, which is highly unlikely, Iran should seriously consider reciprocal action, such as engaging Armenia on possible joint military cooperation and exercises close to the Turkish border to send Ankara an unmistakable message.
Furthermore, with the increasing strength of Maliki's Iraq, and it's friendly disposition towards Iran, a genuine possibility for a joint Iran/Iraq axis exists. If such an alliance is formalized, and if it ever extends to close military cooperation, Iran will have the strategic freedom to push Turkey away, and restrict it's ties with Ankara to purely economic interests.
In addition to these considerations, the Kurdish issue is always relevant in a discussion of Iran/Turkey ties.
Iran is dealing with elements of the PJAK group operating along its north-western border regions. Turkey can provide valuable assistance with the Kurdish problem, but at what price to Iran? It would be far wiser
strategically for Iran to neutralize its Kurdish problem alone, while clandestinely providing support to anti-Turkish Kurdish groups, in the event that proxy elements become useful in any future conflict with Turkey.
Turkey, as a NATO member will undoubtedly be instrumental in the implementation of the much discussed missile shield, which poses a direct security threat to Iran, Russia, and other regional countries. Unless Turkey is willing to abstain from participation in the shield program, which is highly unlikely, Iran should seriously consider reciprocal action, such as engaging Armenia on possible joint military cooperation and exercises close to the Turkish border to send Ankara an unmistakable message.
Furthermore, with the increasing strength of Maliki's Iraq, and it's friendly disposition towards Iran, a genuine possibility for a joint Iran/Iraq axis exists. If such an alliance is formalized, and if it ever extends to close military cooperation, Iran will have the strategic freedom to push Turkey away, and restrict it's ties with Ankara to purely economic interests.
In addition to these considerations, the Kurdish issue is always relevant in a discussion of Iran/Turkey ties.
Iran is dealing with elements of the PJAK group operating along its north-western border regions. Turkey can provide valuable assistance with the Kurdish problem, but at what price to Iran? It would be far wiser
strategically for Iran to neutralize its Kurdish problem alone, while clandestinely providing support to anti-Turkish Kurdish groups, in the event that proxy elements become useful in any future conflict with Turkey.
Saturday, April 21, 2012
Russia May Act if Iran Attacked
4/21/12- This is a brief note on the possibility that in the event Iran is attacked by the U.S. and/or Israel, Russia may take the opportunity to invade Georgia and finally finish off Sakashvilli, thereby opening up an overland route to Russian military bases in Armenia which may be used to transport supplies and materiel to Iran during a conflict.
Russian officials have recently spoken regarding this possibility, and there is certainly a faction in the Kremlin that views a possible attack on Iran as an opportunity for Russia to settle old scores with Georgia while expanding her strategic posture by establishing overland contact with Armenian bases.
Assistance to Iran by Russia through Armenia in the vent of an attack on Iran may not tale the form of overt military aid, but may include covert transfers and other forms of clandestine assistance. More will follow on this matter in time.
Russian officials have recently spoken regarding this possibility, and there is certainly a faction in the Kremlin that views a possible attack on Iran as an opportunity for Russia to settle old scores with Georgia while expanding her strategic posture by establishing overland contact with Armenian bases.
Assistance to Iran by Russia through Armenia in the vent of an attack on Iran may not tale the form of overt military aid, but may include covert transfers and other forms of clandestine assistance. More will follow on this matter in time.
Nuclear Talks No Place for Compromise
4/21/12- The Istanbul talks taking place between Iran and the so-called P5 nations is certainly an opportunity for both sides to fully air out all concerns. Yet, it should not be interpreted by the West as an Iranian capitulation or attempt to compromise, nor should the Iranian side approach the talks from that perspective.
Iran's position on the matter has been clear for quite some time. Thus, the ball is surely in the NATO countries' court as to how we proceed from this point. Undoubtedly, NATO and its minions understand that the existence of Iran's nuclear program, including further enrichment, research, and infrastructure development is not up for negotiation. The only point that is available for discussion is precisely how NATO chooses to accept the fact of Iran's rise and the new order in the Middle East.
The fact is that NATO and its lackeys will either acknowledge and respect Iran's will, or they will continue to saber rattle and blow hot air. The former approach will lead to peace and the opportunity for a prosperous future in the region, while the latter will lead to greater uncertainty and perhaps a war that is in no one's interests.
Iran's position on the matter has been clear for quite some time. Thus, the ball is surely in the NATO countries' court as to how we proceed from this point. Undoubtedly, NATO and its minions understand that the existence of Iran's nuclear program, including further enrichment, research, and infrastructure development is not up for negotiation. The only point that is available for discussion is precisely how NATO chooses to accept the fact of Iran's rise and the new order in the Middle East.
The fact is that NATO and its lackeys will either acknowledge and respect Iran's will, or they will continue to saber rattle and blow hot air. The former approach will lead to peace and the opportunity for a prosperous future in the region, while the latter will lead to greater uncertainty and perhaps a war that is in no one's interests.
Wednesday, March 21, 2012
A Brief Note on Iran's Potential 2013 Presidential Contenders
3/21/12- As President Ahmadinejad sets to fade from the scene at the conclusion of his second term next year, it would be worthwhile to discuss his potential successors.
We ought to begin by briefly discussing Iran's various factions and their current positions of power. The Principlist faction has, of course, been ascendant since 2005. Ahmadinejad, Parliament speaker Ali Larijani, former Revolutionary Gaurds commander and Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and former Gaurds Commander in Chief Mohsen Rezai are the major figures in this faction. The faction, however, is irredeemably split largely because Supreme Leader Khamenei has sided with Larijani, Rezai, and the technocratic principlists against the increasingly anti-clerical, populist, and nationalist rumblings of the Ahmadinejad camp. Ahmadinejad himself was never a regime insider, and he has been firmly ejected from Khamenei's personal network. Thus, we really can no longer view the Principlists as a unified faction since Ahmadinejad and his camp have been eschewed.
The Pragmatic Conservatives, led by Ayatollah Rafsanjani have seen their power diminished since 2009 and it is unlikely that the next president will hail from this camp. Rafsanjani is still chairman of the Expediency Council and the largely neutered Assembly of Experts. Former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani still wields considerably personal influence behind the scenes, while many in the clerical establishment broadly identify with this camp. The Pragmatic Conservatives also have a considerable following among the important bazaari demographic.
The traditional conservatives, represented by the likes of Ayatollah Jannati and Ahmad Khatami retain considerable influence and maintain extensive personal networks, yet they represent the aging old gaurd of the Revolution, and are unlikely to produce the next president.
We finally come to the Reformist camp, represented by the Green movement and its supporters such as Mousavi, Karroubi, and former president Khatami. This faction has been almost completely marginalized from public affairs, although some influential clerics with Reformist tendencies still retain influence both in Qom and in Tehran. Because of the very personal and often private nature of the Iranian political system, even a publicly marginalized faction such as the Reformists can still maintain personal, private ties to the Supreme Leader, and thereby remain relevant.
With all of this in mind, it would be safe to say that the next president is likely to arise out of the newly realigned Principlist camp. Since Ahmadinejad and his supporters have been driven out of the Principlist faction, the most likely contenders for the presidency are Ahmadinejad enemies Larijani, Qalibaf, or Rezai. It is unlikely that any Ahmadinejad Principlists will have much success in 2013.
The final prediction at this point would have to be Larijani in 2013, unless unforeseen events intervene.
We ought to begin by briefly discussing Iran's various factions and their current positions of power. The Principlist faction has, of course, been ascendant since 2005. Ahmadinejad, Parliament speaker Ali Larijani, former Revolutionary Gaurds commander and Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and former Gaurds Commander in Chief Mohsen Rezai are the major figures in this faction. The faction, however, is irredeemably split largely because Supreme Leader Khamenei has sided with Larijani, Rezai, and the technocratic principlists against the increasingly anti-clerical, populist, and nationalist rumblings of the Ahmadinejad camp. Ahmadinejad himself was never a regime insider, and he has been firmly ejected from Khamenei's personal network. Thus, we really can no longer view the Principlists as a unified faction since Ahmadinejad and his camp have been eschewed.
The Pragmatic Conservatives, led by Ayatollah Rafsanjani have seen their power diminished since 2009 and it is unlikely that the next president will hail from this camp. Rafsanjani is still chairman of the Expediency Council and the largely neutered Assembly of Experts. Former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani still wields considerably personal influence behind the scenes, while many in the clerical establishment broadly identify with this camp. The Pragmatic Conservatives also have a considerable following among the important bazaari demographic.
The traditional conservatives, represented by the likes of Ayatollah Jannati and Ahmad Khatami retain considerable influence and maintain extensive personal networks, yet they represent the aging old gaurd of the Revolution, and are unlikely to produce the next president.
We finally come to the Reformist camp, represented by the Green movement and its supporters such as Mousavi, Karroubi, and former president Khatami. This faction has been almost completely marginalized from public affairs, although some influential clerics with Reformist tendencies still retain influence both in Qom and in Tehran. Because of the very personal and often private nature of the Iranian political system, even a publicly marginalized faction such as the Reformists can still maintain personal, private ties to the Supreme Leader, and thereby remain relevant.
With all of this in mind, it would be safe to say that the next president is likely to arise out of the newly realigned Principlist camp. Since Ahmadinejad and his supporters have been driven out of the Principlist faction, the most likely contenders for the presidency are Ahmadinejad enemies Larijani, Qalibaf, or Rezai. It is unlikely that any Ahmadinejad Principlists will have much success in 2013.
The final prediction at this point would have to be Larijani in 2013, unless unforeseen events intervene.
Monday, March 5, 2012
Iran's 2012 Parliamentray Elections: A Victory for Corruption?
3/5/12- The major rift in Iranian politics between supporters of President Ahmadinejad and those who back the Supreme Leader Khamenei appears to have been resolved in favor of the Supreme Leader.
If the results from last week's parliamentary elections are any indication, Khamenei's supporters are unquestionably in the ascendancy. This is certainly troubling news for those who are fed up with the corruption of the clerical class in Iranian society, for it seems that the conservative clergy, ever vigilant in defense of self-interest have brought their power to bear on Ahmadinejad.
How, the reader may ask, did Ahmadinejad run afoul of so many in the clerical establishment? He messed with their money, to put it bluntly. Ahmadinejad, after being elected in 2005 adopted an uncompromising stance against the corruption and outright thievery of certain elements of the clergy. For example, he ended the clergy's flouting of import duties for certain foreign goods, and rendered impossible the registration of stolen cars imported from abroad. Needless to say these measures infuriated those clergymen with parasitic tendencies.
What is more, Ahmadinejad displayed a fiercely independent drive that put him at odds with the Supreme Leader on matters of policy, such as Ahmadinejad's support for the attendance of women at sporting events, his dismissal of Mottaki as foreign minister, his dismissal of Moslehi as Intelligence minister, his mild criticism of Syria's tactics, and his emphasis on Iranian nationalism and national identity.
And now it appears as if the Supreme Leader's camp has succeeded in using the economic uncertainty felt by many Iranians to derail Ahmadinejad's presidency in its final year.
If the results from last week's parliamentary elections are any indication, Khamenei's supporters are unquestionably in the ascendancy. This is certainly troubling news for those who are fed up with the corruption of the clerical class in Iranian society, for it seems that the conservative clergy, ever vigilant in defense of self-interest have brought their power to bear on Ahmadinejad.
How, the reader may ask, did Ahmadinejad run afoul of so many in the clerical establishment? He messed with their money, to put it bluntly. Ahmadinejad, after being elected in 2005 adopted an uncompromising stance against the corruption and outright thievery of certain elements of the clergy. For example, he ended the clergy's flouting of import duties for certain foreign goods, and rendered impossible the registration of stolen cars imported from abroad. Needless to say these measures infuriated those clergymen with parasitic tendencies.
What is more, Ahmadinejad displayed a fiercely independent drive that put him at odds with the Supreme Leader on matters of policy, such as Ahmadinejad's support for the attendance of women at sporting events, his dismissal of Mottaki as foreign minister, his dismissal of Moslehi as Intelligence minister, his mild criticism of Syria's tactics, and his emphasis on Iranian nationalism and national identity.
And now it appears as if the Supreme Leader's camp has succeeded in using the economic uncertainty felt by many Iranians to derail Ahmadinejad's presidency in its final year.
Wednesday, February 15, 2012
An Update and Brief Commentary on Recent Events
2/15/12- Several important developments regarding Iran have occurred since my last post.
Iran has successfully loaded domestically manufactured fuel rods into a medical reactor in Tehran. This is a significant development along Iran's path towards full mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle. Predictably, the U.S. has dismissed Iran's progress as "hype". This is laughable because according to the the U.S. and Israel, Iran's nuclear program is a dangerous menace to the world. If that is so, how come every time Iran announces a nuclear breakthrough, the U.S. dismisses it as bluster and hype?
The U.S. can't have it both ways. Either Iran is incompetent and not to be taken seriously, or its nuclear program is very capable and professionally run. The fact is, the U.S. likes to ridicule and put down Iran and its capabilities when it's convenient to do so from a propaganda perspective, while at other times they play up those same capabilities.
On yesterday's post I mentioned the likelihood that the recent bomb-related incidents in India, Georgia, and Thailand were Israeli false flag operations. One possibility which I neglected to mention is that the MEK Iranian apposition terrorist group, which has confirmed ties to Israel and the U.S. carried out the two operations in India and Georgia, and was planning another operation in Thailand as part of an Israeli sponsored campaign to discredit Iran internationally.
The MEK is a cult-like organization with a long history of terrorist attacks inside Iran and elsewhere. They have links to Israel and have been protected by the U.S. in Iraq where they maintain a base. No evidence thus far has come to light implicating the MEK, yet the possibility is strong that they were involved.
Iran has successfully loaded domestically manufactured fuel rods into a medical reactor in Tehran. This is a significant development along Iran's path towards full mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle. Predictably, the U.S. has dismissed Iran's progress as "hype". This is laughable because according to the the U.S. and Israel, Iran's nuclear program is a dangerous menace to the world. If that is so, how come every time Iran announces a nuclear breakthrough, the U.S. dismisses it as bluster and hype?
The U.S. can't have it both ways. Either Iran is incompetent and not to be taken seriously, or its nuclear program is very capable and professionally run. The fact is, the U.S. likes to ridicule and put down Iran and its capabilities when it's convenient to do so from a propaganda perspective, while at other times they play up those same capabilities.
On yesterday's post I mentioned the likelihood that the recent bomb-related incidents in India, Georgia, and Thailand were Israeli false flag operations. One possibility which I neglected to mention is that the MEK Iranian apposition terrorist group, which has confirmed ties to Israel and the U.S. carried out the two operations in India and Georgia, and was planning another operation in Thailand as part of an Israeli sponsored campaign to discredit Iran internationally.
The MEK is a cult-like organization with a long history of terrorist attacks inside Iran and elsewhere. They have links to Israel and have been protected by the U.S. in Iraq where they maintain a base. No evidence thus far has come to light implicating the MEK, yet the possibility is strong that they were involved.
Tuesday, February 14, 2012
Israeli False Flag Operations
2/14/12- Recently, an Israeli diplomatic vehicle in New Delhi was blown up, another similar vehicle in Tiblisi, Georgia had a bomb attached to it that was later defused, and three alleged "Iranians" in Thailand were injured in an explosion.
There is no chance that any of these acts had any connection to Iran. These were most likely false flag operations carried out by Israel itself. First of all, Indian investigators have asserted that they do not believe the attack in New Delhi had any connection Iran. There are no indications that the Georgian attempt had any connection to Iran either. As far as the Thai incident is concerned, the Thai police claim to have found the men's "Iranian" passports. That in itself means nothing because Israel has routinely forged passports from various nations in the past, and there is no reason to believe that they couldn't have forged these Iranian ones. For example, not long ago Israeli agents murdered a Hamas operative in Dubai using forged Irish, Australian and British passports.
Israel's reaction to these events betrays their purpose. They have instantly been used by a hysterical Israeli government to play up their propaganda campaign against Iran. Once again, just as with the bogus terror plot against the Saudi ambassador to Washington, one must ask who gains from these events. Iran? Hardly. Israel gains when Iran is made to look like a sponsor of terror. The Israelis know that and they are definitely morally and psychologically depraved enough to perpetrate false flag operations to achieve their aims.
In view of the Israeli/American public hysteria (which doesn't reflect private concern over an Iranian military threat, but rather a strategic one) Iran must remain calm and reserved so as to contrast itself favorably against Israel's infantile rants. While I agree with the idea that strength must be projected and manifested outward in a geopolitical sense, bellicose rhetoric should be left to the war mongers, while a three-thousand year old civilization like Iran ought to present an image of adamantine resolve and quiet determination to achieve its rightful place on the world stage. Thus, to paraphrase Teddy Roosevelt, Iran must speak softly while continuing to brandish a big deterrent stick.
There is no chance that any of these acts had any connection to Iran. These were most likely false flag operations carried out by Israel itself. First of all, Indian investigators have asserted that they do not believe the attack in New Delhi had any connection Iran. There are no indications that the Georgian attempt had any connection to Iran either. As far as the Thai incident is concerned, the Thai police claim to have found the men's "Iranian" passports. That in itself means nothing because Israel has routinely forged passports from various nations in the past, and there is no reason to believe that they couldn't have forged these Iranian ones. For example, not long ago Israeli agents murdered a Hamas operative in Dubai using forged Irish, Australian and British passports.
Israel's reaction to these events betrays their purpose. They have instantly been used by a hysterical Israeli government to play up their propaganda campaign against Iran. Once again, just as with the bogus terror plot against the Saudi ambassador to Washington, one must ask who gains from these events. Iran? Hardly. Israel gains when Iran is made to look like a sponsor of terror. The Israelis know that and they are definitely morally and psychologically depraved enough to perpetrate false flag operations to achieve their aims.
In view of the Israeli/American public hysteria (which doesn't reflect private concern over an Iranian military threat, but rather a strategic one) Iran must remain calm and reserved so as to contrast itself favorably against Israel's infantile rants. While I agree with the idea that strength must be projected and manifested outward in a geopolitical sense, bellicose rhetoric should be left to the war mongers, while a three-thousand year old civilization like Iran ought to present an image of adamantine resolve and quiet determination to achieve its rightful place on the world stage. Thus, to paraphrase Teddy Roosevelt, Iran must speak softly while continuing to brandish a big deterrent stick.
Tuesday, February 7, 2012
Iran and the Syrian Civil War
2/07/12- In a previous post on this blog I discussed Iran's dilemma regarding the situation in Syria, namely that continued support for the Assad regime could damage Iran's image throughout the Middle East as a champion of revolutionary Islam and the downtrodden.
Since that previous post, however, events in Syria have taken a decided turn towards genuine civil war. The opposition to President Assad has completely renounced non-violence and has embarked upon an armed struggle against the regime. This turn of events has, in a sense, made Iran's situation vis-a-vis Syria much easier. Iran can now continue to support Assad more comfortably, openly, and strongly, because the Syrian regime is no longer repressing a peaceful, non-violent protest movement, but is dealing with an armed insurrection.
Furthermore, from the perspective of Shia Iran, the fall of the Assad regime would be more than just a strategic and geopolitical setback. It will also be a victory for militant Wahabi and Salafi Sunni Islam, and by extension, Saudi Arabia.
The most worrying development in the Middle East over the course of the previous decade, but especially within the past several years has been the increasingly clear demarcation of sectarian battle lines and spheres of influence. Shia Iran, Iraq, and Syria, along with Hezbollah in Lebanon can now be viewed as an anti-Saudi, anti-Wahabi and Salafi axis in the region. The Saudis, Qatar, and the GCC, along with what appears to be a burgeoning militant Sunni takeover in Egypt forms the Sunni axis.
The great x-factor in this equation seems to be Turkey, which is a majority Sunni country with a moderate Islamist government that has taken sides against the Syrian regime. Whether Turkey's intentions are to increase its cachet with the rising Sunni Islamist governments around the region, or whether the Turkish government is preparing the way for close ties with a post-Assad Sunni government in Syria remains to be seen. What is of concern, however, is that it may impossible for any regional country to remain neutral in all-out sectarian strife that appears to be in store for the region.
Since that previous post, however, events in Syria have taken a decided turn towards genuine civil war. The opposition to President Assad has completely renounced non-violence and has embarked upon an armed struggle against the regime. This turn of events has, in a sense, made Iran's situation vis-a-vis Syria much easier. Iran can now continue to support Assad more comfortably, openly, and strongly, because the Syrian regime is no longer repressing a peaceful, non-violent protest movement, but is dealing with an armed insurrection.
Furthermore, from the perspective of Shia Iran, the fall of the Assad regime would be more than just a strategic and geopolitical setback. It will also be a victory for militant Wahabi and Salafi Sunni Islam, and by extension, Saudi Arabia.
The most worrying development in the Middle East over the course of the previous decade, but especially within the past several years has been the increasingly clear demarcation of sectarian battle lines and spheres of influence. Shia Iran, Iraq, and Syria, along with Hezbollah in Lebanon can now be viewed as an anti-Saudi, anti-Wahabi and Salafi axis in the region. The Saudis, Qatar, and the GCC, along with what appears to be a burgeoning militant Sunni takeover in Egypt forms the Sunni axis.
The great x-factor in this equation seems to be Turkey, which is a majority Sunni country with a moderate Islamist government that has taken sides against the Syrian regime. Whether Turkey's intentions are to increase its cachet with the rising Sunni Islamist governments around the region, or whether the Turkish government is preparing the way for close ties with a post-Assad Sunni government in Syria remains to be seen. What is of concern, however, is that it may impossible for any regional country to remain neutral in all-out sectarian strife that appears to be in store for the region.
Tuesday, January 24, 2012
Iran's Nuclear Program and the Decline of the West in the Middle East
1/24/12- A detached observer may wonder, while gazing upon the sorry spectacle that has become the European Union, why the EU continues to antagonize Iran with the threat of an oil embargo while its own house is in such grave economic disorder. Does Iran's pursuit of full mastery of the nuclear cycle represent that much of a strategic threat to the EU that the latter is willing to jeopardize its own economic recovery to hinder Iran?
The answer is yes. As has been mentioned on this blog before, Iran's nuclear program is not a military threat to anyone, yet what it does is erase any military threats that Israel or the U.S. could pose towards Iran. Once Iran achieves full mastery of the nuclear cycle, all parties in the region will have to recognize and come to grips with the fact that the much vaunted "military option" that is so often said to still be on the proverbial table, will no longer be an option. In the words of Joe Biden, that is a big f'ing deal.
And this reality is precisely why the U.S., E.U., Israel, and their Persian Gulf Arab lackeys are so concerned about Iran's nuclear program. They don't fear an Iranian nuclear attack at all. What they fear is the coming day when their military power is rendered meaningless vis-a-vis Iran. And without the threat of Israeli/American military arms, their power to contain Iran's regional ambitions will evaporate.
This state of affairs will effectively lead to a Middle East in which Iran controls a significant sphere of influence which will be rivaled only by the American sphere of influence which includes Saudi Arabia and its other client states. With enormous influence in a new, Shia-dominated Iraq, Iran will be poised to challenge the American/Israeli/Saudi axis and rival them for power and influence throughout the region.
And so given this reality, the E.U., which profits from the power of the American/Israeli/Saudi axis is even willing to harm its own economic recovery in order to attempt to delay the coming day when Iranian power forms a dominant axis in the Middle East.
The answer is yes. As has been mentioned on this blog before, Iran's nuclear program is not a military threat to anyone, yet what it does is erase any military threats that Israel or the U.S. could pose towards Iran. Once Iran achieves full mastery of the nuclear cycle, all parties in the region will have to recognize and come to grips with the fact that the much vaunted "military option" that is so often said to still be on the proverbial table, will no longer be an option. In the words of Joe Biden, that is a big f'ing deal.
And this reality is precisely why the U.S., E.U., Israel, and their Persian Gulf Arab lackeys are so concerned about Iran's nuclear program. They don't fear an Iranian nuclear attack at all. What they fear is the coming day when their military power is rendered meaningless vis-a-vis Iran. And without the threat of Israeli/American military arms, their power to contain Iran's regional ambitions will evaporate.
This state of affairs will effectively lead to a Middle East in which Iran controls a significant sphere of influence which will be rivaled only by the American sphere of influence which includes Saudi Arabia and its other client states. With enormous influence in a new, Shia-dominated Iraq, Iran will be poised to challenge the American/Israeli/Saudi axis and rival them for power and influence throughout the region.
And so given this reality, the E.U., which profits from the power of the American/Israeli/Saudi axis is even willing to harm its own economic recovery in order to attempt to delay the coming day when Iranian power forms a dominant axis in the Middle East.
Friday, January 6, 2012
Hormuz, Sanctions, and the Western Media
Tensions between Iran and the EU/U.S. have greatly increased in recent weeks, primarily as a result of a concerted push by the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany to precipitate a confrontation with Iran, ostensibly over its nuclear program.
Of course, the world knows that Iran's nuclear program is not a military threat to anyone. It is, rather, a definite strategic threat to Western domination of the Middle East. In addition, most rational analysts agree that sanctions never work, especially against a nation with massive energy reserves in a global environment in which oil and natural gas are extremely hot commodities.
The question then remains: what exactly are these four countries seeking to accomplish by the implementation of draconian sanctions against Iran? The short answer is that they know full well that sanctions are practically ineffective, yet their great hope is to affect the psyche of the Iranian people and create an increased atmosphere of economic panic and uncertainty over a possible military confrontation. Thus, these latest round of sanctions are intended to have more of a psychological effect than any practical results.
Earlier this week, it seemed as if the sanctions were beginning to have their intended result as the Iranian rial went into a nose-dive, and a general atmosphere of financial panic began to arise in Iran. Yet, as the week has progressed, the Iranian government has successfully stabilised the exchange rate through the manipulation of interest rates and other banking policies. The dollar/rial rate has now returned to its prior position. The near term financial panic has subsided, yet uncertainty continues to prevail among the general population.
It will be interesting to see how Russia and China react to these unfolding events. I predict that China will continue to strongly oppose increased sanctions against Iran in public, while in private the two nations will reach an agreement on the eastward re-routing of Iranian tankers dedicated to the delivery of oil to the EU in the event of an EU embargo on Iranian oil. Thus, Iran will suffer no actual harm from any of these new sanctions. Psychological harm is another matter, however, and Tehran should take additional steps to reassure a jittery public that stability will be maintained.
Of course, the world knows that Iran's nuclear program is not a military threat to anyone. It is, rather, a definite strategic threat to Western domination of the Middle East. In addition, most rational analysts agree that sanctions never work, especially against a nation with massive energy reserves in a global environment in which oil and natural gas are extremely hot commodities.
The question then remains: what exactly are these four countries seeking to accomplish by the implementation of draconian sanctions against Iran? The short answer is that they know full well that sanctions are practically ineffective, yet their great hope is to affect the psyche of the Iranian people and create an increased atmosphere of economic panic and uncertainty over a possible military confrontation. Thus, these latest round of sanctions are intended to have more of a psychological effect than any practical results.
Earlier this week, it seemed as if the sanctions were beginning to have their intended result as the Iranian rial went into a nose-dive, and a general atmosphere of financial panic began to arise in Iran. Yet, as the week has progressed, the Iranian government has successfully stabilised the exchange rate through the manipulation of interest rates and other banking policies. The dollar/rial rate has now returned to its prior position. The near term financial panic has subsided, yet uncertainty continues to prevail among the general population.
It will be interesting to see how Russia and China react to these unfolding events. I predict that China will continue to strongly oppose increased sanctions against Iran in public, while in private the two nations will reach an agreement on the eastward re-routing of Iranian tankers dedicated to the delivery of oil to the EU in the event of an EU embargo on Iranian oil. Thus, Iran will suffer no actual harm from any of these new sanctions. Psychological harm is another matter, however, and Tehran should take additional steps to reassure a jittery public that stability will be maintained.
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